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* 2002 (KRF-2002072-BM2085).
** Byoung-Soo Park(Kyung Hee University), Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, "The State, Societal Acceptability and Neoliberal Adjustment in Mexico".

가 . 1980
 가 가
 가
 1980 1990 1)
 가 ,
 가
 가 가
 가 , 가
 가 ,
 , 가
 , 1980
 , 가,

.2)

1) ‘ ,

IMF

2)

Cook et

가 가 , ,

가 , , ; , , . ‘ , ’

가

‘ , ’

‘ , ’

가가

(Carlos Salinas de Gortari)

가가

1980

가

가

’(, 1994)

1988 12

al., 1994; , 1994; , 1995; , 1995; Morris, 1995

가 .

.3)

가 ‘ , ‘ , ‘

(PRONASOL),

가

가 ‘ ,

가 ‘ ,

가 ‘ ,

가 ‘ ,

가 ,

가가

가

가

3) 1989 (Cananea) , 1989 (Modelo)
 , 1989 (Ford) , 1990 (TAMSA; Tubos de
 Acero de Mexico) , 1992 (Volkswagen)

가

가 . 가

, , 가 .

. 가가 가

가 .

가

가 가

가 . 가

(, 1994: 140). 가

가

가 . 가가

4)

가 가

가

가

가

가

가

4) 가 가 가

가

,
,

가,

가

가
가
가가

(, 1998: 78, 92).

가

가가

가

가

가

가

(, 1994: 141).

가

가 가

(修辭)

(, 1992: , 2000: 298, 301).

1980

가

가

1980

가

(EZLN)

.5)

가

가-

guel de la Madrid Hurtado) (1982-1988)

(Mi-

가가

'(liberalismo social)

. 1989 2

NAFTA

1992

20%

5) EZLN

(NAFTA)
가

1994 1 1

가
EZLN

13.5% .
 1985 92% .
 1990 19% .
 1989 5 12 .
 ,
 1993
 가
 ,
 가
 가 가
 가 가
 가 가
 가 (1998: 69-70).
 가
 , , ,
 가가 . 가가
 , ,
 .
 195 .⁶⁾
 가
 379
 .⁶⁾

6)

. GDP 16% 가 1991 3.5%, 1992
 , 1987 160%
 1991 19%, 1992 13% ,1993 10%

(Hamilton &
 Kim, 1993; Morris, 1995: 80). 1985
 1990 26 1,800 1992 43 9,300
 , 1994 109 7,200 .

가

1980 100 1990
 42.0, 1991 39.5, 1992 38.9, 1993 37.9, 1994 37.9 1980
 40% 가 , <
 3-1>. 1982 1988
 38.3% . 11
 . 1994 1982
 (40.8%) . 1982-88 55.2%
 38.3% (Villas
 1995: 161).

(TELMEX),
 (SICARTSA),
 NEA , 1982

(MEXICANA),
 (ASEMEX), TV
 18

(AHMSA),
 (Televisa), CANA-

< 3-1> , , , 1978 ~ 1994
(1978)

1978	103	103	101	101	351	351	180	180	180	180
1979	120	101	146	124	411	348	210	178	211	179
1980	141	94	179	120	506	339	240	161	260	174
1981	183	96	234	112	678	355	310	162	348	182
1982	282	93	407	134	1,062	350	540	178	545	180
1983	429	70	596	97	1,651	269	860	140	848	138
1984	659	65	951	94	2,568	253	1,400	138	1,180	116
1985	1,023	64	1,503	94	4,156	260	2,200	138	1,868	117
1986	1,887	95	2,625	88	6,638	335	4,000	202	3,409	172
1987	4,286	62	5,820	84	15,540	225	9,440	137	6,646	96
1988	7,251	48	12,270	82	32,410	216	19,310	129	13,141	88
1989	8,547	48	14,229	80	42,360	239	24,820	140	16,616	94
1990	10,238	46	17,145	76	55,560	247	31,640	141	22,578	100
1991	11,598	42	21,260	77	72,180	262	38,230	139	27,974	101
1992	12,255	38	23,811	75	89,970	282	44,800	141	29,534	93
1993	13,193	39	26,124	76	103,530	306	47,130	139	27,425	81
1994	13,974	38	27,383	74	108,920	296	52,910	144	68,670	187

< > Villas(1995: 163) 6

. ,
1981 1990
3,210 4,130
1,370 1,730 가
(1-4) 1979
7.7% 1989 15.1% (Villas 1995: 161).
(3-2). 1983 1994 190
가 . 110
1,040
1/3 가
(Villas 1995: 161).

< 3-2> , 1982 ~ 1993

(100)

	A	B	C=B/A	D	E=D-B	F	G=D-F	H=G-B	I=H/G	%
1982	72.37	21.5	29.71	22.9	1.4	0.00	22.90	1.4	6.11	
1983	73.89	21.0	28.42	23.8	2.8	0.18	23.63	2.6	11.12	
1984	75.45	21.5	28.50	24.8	3.3	0.38	24.38	2.9	12.80	
1985	77.03	22.0	28.56	25.7	3.7	0.60	25.15	3.1	12.52	
1986	78.65	21.6	27.46	26.8	5.2	0.82	25.95	4.3	16.75	
1987	80.30	21.9	27.27	27.8	5.9	1.07	26.77	4.9	18.18	
1988	81.99	22.1	26.95	28.9	6.8	1.33	27.61	5.5	19.96	
1989	83.71	22.3	26.64	30.1	7.8	1.61	28.48	6.2	21.70	
1990	85.47	22.5	26.32	31.0	8.5	1.92	29.12	6.6	22.74	
1991	87.27	23.1	26.47	32.0	8.9	2.24	29.77	6.7	22.41	
1992	89.10	23.2	26.06	33.0	9.8	2.59	30.43	7.2	23.70	
1993	90.97	23.2	25.50	34.0	10.8	2.96	31.09	7.9	25.37	
1994	93.07	23.4	25.14	35.1	11.7	3.36	31.75	8.4	26.31	

< > Villas(1995: 164) 7

가 .
 1986 0.32, 1990 0.42, 1992 0.41, 1994 0.41 가
 40%가
 GNP 1984 14.3% 1989 12.9%
 10%가
 32.8% 37.9% (1995: 218).
 가 1981 1992
 52.8% 59.3%
 42.6% 30.6%

< 3-3> , 1980-1991

가			
1980	40.6	53.8	5.6
1981	42.6	52.8	4.6
1982	41.6	54.6	4.8
1983	35.7	62.1	2.2
1984	34.4	62.2	3.4
1985	33.7	59.7	6.6
1986	34.8	60.7	4.8
1987	32.1	60.3	7.6
1988	30.6	61.8	7.6
1989	29.5	62.4	8.2
1990	28.1	62.7	9.2
1991	28.9	61.4	9.7
1992	30.6	59.3	10.1

< > Villas(1995: 165) 8

가

1. :

가

가

가

가

가

1990

가

1990

가

1990 5

1990 4 5

FTA 가 NA-

60

NAFTA

/ , 1996: 5).

가 NAFTA

NAFTA 1980

,7) NAFTA

, 1990

NAFTA

.8)

2. : (PRONASOL)

가

가

가

가

가

7) NAFTA가 가 . NAFTA 가 1994 79 가 1990 26

8) NAFTA , 1994: 50, 57; , 1995: 52-53; Alva, 1996: 46-47; Hendelman, 1997: 128-129; Grayson, 1991: 109; Gentleman & Zubek, 1992: 76-77

가 , ,

가 , ,

가 ,

가

가

가 .

, ,

가 PRONASOL (PRONASOL) .9) 가가

RONASOL 1988

1988 PRONASOL .10)

PRONASOL 가

PRONASOL .11)

가 PRONASOL CTM (CNC)

(Cook et al., 1994: 32; Morris, 1995: 91-92; Dresser,

9) 가

10) 가 PRONASOL PRONASOL

11) PRONASOL PRONASOL PRONASOL

(Haggard & Kaufman, 1995: 303)

1994: 161-163).

가 PRONASOL

가 PRONASOL

< 4-1> PRONASOL
 1989 22 8 6 1992 60 7 8
 가 GDP PRONASOL
 1989 0.45% 1992 1.08%
 PRONASOL 1989
 7.39% 1992 12.34% .12)

< 4-1> PRONASOL (: 1)

	1989	1990	1991	1992
PRONASOL	22.86(-)*	37.36(6.40)	47.16(26.25)	60.78(28.88)
GDP PRONASOL	0.45%	0.71%	0.88%	1.08%
GDP	6.14%	6.40%	7.85%	8.79%
PRONASOL	7.39%	11.05%	11.28%	12.34%

: Lusting 1994: 89.
 : () PRONASOL

12)

가

PRONASOL

(Hamilton & Kim, 1993).

PRONASOL

13),

가

PRONASOL

.14)

PRONASOL

1991 8

1/2

7

1991

PRONASOL

61.5%

64%

가

(PRD) 8.3%

1988

1/5

1991

PRI

가

1991

가

(PNMPMI)

가

가

(CANACINTRA)

13) PRONASOL

PRI-NASOL

가

14)

가

가

PRONASOL 가

(, 1998: 81; Shadlen, 2000: 74-76; Morris, 1995: 82-83; Alva, 1996: 31).¹⁵⁾

가

(Weyland, 1998: 541-542).

가

가

(PRI)

가

가

3. : ‘ (neo sindicalismo)

가

가

15)

가

Shadlen

CANACINTRA가 1940
가 ,

1980

(Shadlen, 2000: 77-87).

가

16)(Morris, 1995: 83-84).

가

가

(CTM)

(CROC) CTM

(FESEBES)

1990 (STRM)

(SME) FESEBES 가

CTM

17) , 가

16) 1989 (Cananea) 가 , 1989

(Modelo) 1989 (Ford)

, 1990 7 (TAMSA; Tubos de Acero de Mexico)

, 1992 (Volkswagen) 1 5

FESEBES

FESEBES

CTM

FESEBES

CTM
FESEBES

18)

FESEBES

CTM

(Cook, 1995: 83-84;

Aguilar, 1992: 60).

가-

가

,

가

가

CTM

1988

가-

가-

가

가

(Cook et al., 1994: 29-30).

17) FESEBES
가

18) FESEBES

가 (VW)
1992 9

(Morris, 1995: 85-86; Tirado, 1998:

198-199).

. PRI

PRI

. 1993

CTM

,
(Genaro Borrego) PRI

(Morris, 1995: 86-87).

가

가

가-

, CTM

PRI

CTM

. CTM

CTM

(Juan Moisés

Callejas)

“

”

1992 CTM

CTM 가

“

” . CTM (FORD),
 (TORNEL), (MODELO)
 , (VW)
 (Morris, 1995: 87; Cook, 1995: 87;
 , 1994: 195; Aguilar, 1992: 84).

가

가

가 ,

가

, 가
 1982 가
 가
 가 , 가
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 SOL (NAFTA)가 PRONA-
 가
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 PRI
 가
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가

가 가 가가

가가 가

Abstract

Neo-liberal adjustment policies were carried out in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. They usually had an adverse impact on the standard of living of the poorer classes (e.g. workers and peasants), who suffered firings, higher unemployment, wage cuts and worsening working conditions, as a result of privatization, deregulation and trade liberalization. Since neo-liberal adjustment impacted most adversely on the lower classes, it was to be expected that resistance to these policies would be fiercest within these sectors. However, this has not always been the case.

Neo-liberal adjustment initiatives were accepted in many Latin American countries without great resistance, and in some countries was supported by the lower classes (e.g. Argentina, Peru and Uruguay). There are many variables that might explain this situation, such as the strength of civil society, attitudes towards the state and the ability of political leaders to convince voters that no realistic alternative existed.

This article focuses on the state's role in gaining widespread support

for the neo-liberal adjustment programme pushed through by Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gotari during his term in office between 1988-1994. In order to explain lower class acquiescence, the role of the state is analysed with regard to persuasion, compensation and repression. First, the Mexican state emphasised the need to change state directed economic structures to that of a more open market-driven economic policy, and succeeded in persuading many citizens of the desirability of this switch if the economic crisis was to be overcome. Second, the article shows how potential losers were bought off via compensation packages. Third, when the lower classes(e.g. workers and peasants) oppose the neoliberal economic adjustment in spite of the State's 'persuasion' and 'compensation', the State forcefully imposes that policy on them by means of 'repression'.

Key Words: Neo-liberalism, Adjustment, State's Role, Persuasion, Compensation, Repression / , , 가 , , ,

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(2001), : 1982-1997 , .

(1994), 「 : , 가 , pp. 49-78.

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(1995), 「 : , 1995 .

(1994), 「1980 : 가 ‘ ’ 가?」, , Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 171-207.

_____(1998), IMF : , .

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